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Competition Law Remedies: In Search of a Theory 
Ioannis Lianos* 
1. Introduction 
 
For a long time, the debate on Article 102 TFEU has focused on the interpretation 
of the different constitutive elements of the abuse of a dominant position, the 
opposition between a “form-based” and an “effects-based” approach, and the 
definition of the scope of the special responsibility of dominant firms to preserve 
competition. The issue of remedies has been relatively neglected. The coming of age 
of European Union (EU) competition law on Article 102 TFEU with a number of 
decisions on high profile abuse of dominance cases involving important international 
undertakings and the adoption of complex remedial schemes has brought the issue 
of remedies for the abuse of a dominant position to the center of the attention of 
competition law policy makers, enforcers, and academics.1 
The Microsoft decision in the United States (US) and in the EU has been the 
catalyst of this increasing interest on the topic of remedies. There was little suspense 
over the existence of a dominant position or that of an abuse. The main concern 
expressed related to the remedies that were adopted in this case.2 Some authors 
argued that these remedies failed to achieve their objectives.3 Other authors were 
more measured in their judgement.4 The Microsoft case did indeed put competition 
authorities and the courts to the difficult position of engineering a remedy that would 
achieve a specific market outcome. In the US case, Judge Jackson, of the DC 
District Court, had ordered the breakup of Microsoft into several different 
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1
 See OECD, Policy Roundtables: Remedies and Sanctions in Abuse of Dominance Cases, (2006) 
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/20/17/38623413.pdf;  NICHOLAS ECONOMIDES & IOANNIS 
LIANOS, A Critical Appraisal of Remedies in the E.U. Microsoft Cases, 2010 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 346 
(2010).  
2
 For a detailed analysis see Nicholas Economides & Ioannis Lianos, The Quest for Appropriate 
Remedies in the EC Microsoft Cases: A Comparative Appraisal, in MICROSOFT ON TRIAL: LEGAL AND 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF A TRANSATLANTIC ANTITRUST CASE 393 (Luca Rubini ed., 2010). 
3
 Carl Shapiro, Microsoft: A Remedial Failure, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 739 (2009). 
4
 Keith N. Hylton, Remedies, Antitrust Law and Microsoft: Comment of Shapiro, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 773 
(2009); and the articles published in the special issue Symposium: Remedies for Dominant Firm 
Misconduct, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 11 et seq., (2009). 
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companies.5 Microsoft’s terms (royalties) for the licences to its communication 
protocols also had to be made attractive so as to increase the number of licensees, 
relatively few at the beginning of the remedial process.6 Microsoft was also asked to 
perform a number of promotional activities in order to attract new licensees. In the 
EU case, Microsoft was required to offer an unbundled version of the Windows 
operating system, without Windows Media Player. The explicit aim of the remedy 
was to challenge Microsoft’s distributional advantage and the implicit aim to lower 
Microsoft’s market share in the operating system market.7 
These relatively complex and far reaching remedies, in terms of state intervention 
into the market, raise the issue of the Commission’s discretion and the relation 
between the remedy and the antitrust liability phase in a competition law case. One 
position is to consider that “[t]he nature of the remedy sought in an antitrust case is 
often . . . an important clue to the soundness of the antitrust claim”8 (the “if you 
cannot fix it, it isn’t broken” argument). The effectiveness of the remedy would thus 
be a limit to the extension of the antitrust liability and the scope of Article 102 TFEU. 
Although it is clear that, in principle, the costs of remedies should not outweigh the 
consumer benefit they achieve, some contend that plaintiffs employ a sequential 
information model that addresses one issue at a time. It would be therefore 
inappropriate to dismiss a case simply because the plaintiff did not identify an 
adequate remedy. Harry First rightly observes, “it seems inevitable that plaintiffs will 
refine their case as they learn more in the course of the litigation process,” in 
particular in high tech industries where technological change is so complex and so 
rapid that there is a need for quick action.9  
However, I will argue that it would be risky, at the same time, to provide full 
discretion to the Commission adopt remedies that have a remote link to the scope of 
the antitrust liability identified. As I will explain in the next section, one should not 
                                                          
5
 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000). 
6
 William H. Page & Seldon J. Childers, Software Development as an Antitrust Remedy: Lessons from 
the Enforcement of the Microsoft Communications Protocol Licensing Requirement, 14 MICH. 
TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 77, 114 (2007). 
7
 See EU Seeks Big Drop in Microsoft Market Share, REUTERS, Sept. 17, 2007, available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL1720058720070917. 
8
 Brunswick Corp. v Riegel Textile Corp, 752 F.2d 261, 267 (7th Cir. 1984). 
9
 Harry First, Netscape is Dead: Remedy Lessons from the Microsoft Litigation 31 (NYU Law & Econ. 
Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 08–49, 2008), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1260803. 
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separate questions of remedy from questions of liability as proponents of 
“discretionary remedialism” often do. “Discretionary remedialism”10 is the “view that 
courts [in this case we will add competition authorities] have discretion to award the 
‘appropriate’ remedy in the circumstances of each individual case rather than being 
limited to specific (perhaps historically determined) remedies for each category of 
causative events.”11 The third section will attempt to integrate the issue of 
discretionary remedialism and the distinction between the liability and remedial 
phase to the broader question of the relation between efficiency, distributive justice 
on the one hand and corrective justice on the other. The thoughts included in this 
section are preliminary and are part of some ongoing work by the author. The fourth 
section will examine the importance of “discretionary remedialism,” in particular in 
the context of antitrust, but also will analyse why it is important to limit its effects.  
The fifth section will explore the objectives pursued by competition law remedies, in 
order to show that a coherent theory of competition law remedies is incompatible 
with a sharp dichotomy between liability and remedy questions. The sixth section 
(and the Annex) will provide illustrations of the link between the two issues by 
looking to the past jurisprudence on remedies of the European Commission and the 
European Courts. The emergence of a remedial proportionality test in EU 
competition law demonstrates the necessary logical connection between the remedy 
and the liability phase. The seventh section will explore if, and how, the remedial 
proportionality test will operate in the context of an “effects-based approach” under 
Article 102 TFEU. 
 
2. Discretionary Remedialism and its Necessary Limits 
 
The legal nature of “remedies” in legal taxonomy has been a matter of 
controversy and doctrinal speculation. Is it important to distinguish what constitutes a 
substantive issue from what can be characterized as a remedial issue? Are remedies 
                                                          
10
 A term first employed in the context of restitution by Professor Peter Birks, Three Kinds of Objection 
to Discretionary Remedialism, 29 U.W. AUSTRALIA L. REV. 1 (2000), who was a fervent critic of 
“discretionary remedialism.” 
11
 Simon Evans, Defending Discretionary Remedialism, 23 SYDNEY L. REV. 463, 463 (2001). For a 
general discussion; see Darryn Jenson, The Rights and Wrongs of Discretionary Remedialism, 
SINGAPORE J. LEGAL STUD. 178 (2003). 
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related to procedural issues, or should they be distinguished from both substance 
and procedure? Views of course diverge. Some authors have proclaimed that “there 
is no law of remedies.”12 At the same time they acknowledged that remedies “have 
always been the means by which the abstractions of the substantive law are 
translated into concrete terms,” thus advancing the view that remedies are more a 
sort of social institution than a proper legal one.13 Others defend the thesis that 
remedies “should be eliminated from our analytical vocabulary—that is from the 
vocabulary which we use when we mean to be taken seriously and to be 
understood”.14 The term remedy is found “chameleonic, for as the context shifts its 
meaning takes on different colours,” for example, “in the medical world, a remedy 
may be either curative, therapeutic or both.”15 Undeniably, any attempt to provide a 
more precise legal definition of the term has faced important conceptual difficulties. 
One could consider that the term remedy refers to prevention as well as cure for the 
violation of a right: it is “the action or suit by means of which a right is protected” or 
“the protection which the action or suit affords.”16 
The linkage of remedies to rights was exemplified by the maxim, ubi jus, ibi 
remedium, which assumes that rights are legal prerequisites for remedies while, at 
the same time, a right defines a remedy. We know of course that this thesis is not 
accurate, as there are rights for which there is no remedy. A different view is that 
remedies are secondary rights “of instrumental character;” they imply the existence 
of primary rights that are conferred “for the better protection and enforcement of 
those other rights and duties whose existence they so suppose.”17 This approach 
relies on the existence of a close connection between the substantive right and the 
remedy. The latter is conceived as a secondary right, superposed to the 
superstructure of the primary right that has been violated (wrong). Wrongs are 
violations of primary rights that give rise to secondary rights, whose nature may be 
sanctioning (preventive) or remedial (reparative). Before a wrong gives rise to a 
                                                          
12
 Charles Alan Wright, The Law of Remedies as a Social Institution, 18 U. DET. L.J. 376 , 376 (1955). 
13
 Id. 
14
 Peter Birks, Rights, Wrongs, and Remedies, 20 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 3 (2000). 
15
 KELLIS E. PARKER, MODERN JUDICIAL REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 10 (Little Brown 1975); see 
also Birks, supra note 14 (“anything that alleviates, eliminates, or prevents can be referred to as a 
remedy”). 
16
 CHRISTOPHER C. LANGDELL, A BRIEF SURVEY OF EQUITY JURISDICTION 19 (The Harvard Law Review 
Association 1904). 
17
 JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE OR THE PHILOSOPHY OF POSITIVE LAW 762 (Robert 
Campbell ed., John Murray 5th ed. 1885). 
 7 
 
secondary (remedial) right, it is essential to examine if there is a legal cause of 
action. The concept of legal cause of action breaks the direct causality chain 
between primary rights and remedies implied by the maxim ubi jus, ibi remedium. A 
specific remedy does not necessarily follow the violation of the primary right. The 
relation between these three concepts has been explained in the following terms: 
Primary rights describe a person’s initial legal entitlement. Secondary rights 
describe the remedies to which he is entitled if the primary right is violated. When 
this violation takes place (for example, a tort is committed or contract breached), 
we talk of there being an injustice and a legal cause of action. Causes of action 
describe those events which consist in the violation of private law rights, or, to 
use different words of my own, primary injustices. Remedies constitute the law’s 
response to such events and describe a secondary level of entitlement, 
substituted by the law for the first. Causes of action provide us with answers to 
the question when legal relief is to be given; remedies answer the question how it 
is to be given.18 
The reference to “causes of action” provides an intermediary step between 
primary rights and remedies, thus making clear that the two concepts should be 
distinguished from each other. The criteria used to define the violation of the primary 
right are not similar to those giving birth to the secondary right. The two can indeed 
operate independently of one another. The violation of a primary right may yield a 
whole range of responses: different types of secondary rights, which do not 
necessarily have any logical connection to the specific wrong, or violation of the 
primary right. They might give rise to substitutionary remedies, such as damages or 
fines, even if these do not correspond to a specific type of wrong committed and 
might indeed be employed for various forms of violation of the primary right: “as a 
jellyfish trails its tentacles in the warm sea, so from many civil wrongs dangle a 
plurality of remedial strings.”19 Law treats liability and remedy as legally distinct. At 
the same time, employing the terminology “causes of action” indicates that the 
concept of remedy should not be confined to “forms of action,” that is legal claims 
                                                          
18
 Kit Barker, Rescuing Remedialism in Unjust Enrichment Law: Why Remedies Are Right, 57 
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 301, 319 (1998). 
19
 Birks, supra note 14, at 7. 
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that are channelled through (and understood by reference to) prescribed forms of 
action.20  
Alternatively, it is possible to consider that a remedy is “an action, or the law’s 
configuration of the actionability of a claimant’s story” and thus to establish a strict 
separation between the concept of remedy and that of the violation of the primary 
right or wrong committed.21 The term remedial will be used in this case essentially as 
a synonym of discretionary.22 This position will conceptualize remedies as a specific 
form of judicial decision-making. I will use the terminology of service judicial acts 
(“actes juridictionnels de service”), as opposed to declaratory judicial acts, whose 
main function is to acknowledge the violation of the primary right. The remedies will 
be in the decision-maker’s discretion according to the criteria of appropriateness. 
Liability and remedy thus would be separate concepts where, “liability triggers the 
court’s discretion in the matter of the remedy.”23 Rejecting the existence of a 
connection between primary rights and remedies, the theory of discretionary 
remedialism tolerates only procedural limits on remedial discretion. This could 
increase uncertainty and unpredictability as to the nature and form of the remedy. 
Uncertainty and unpredictability are certainly to be avoided with regard to the 
areas of law that rely on private governance (i.e., contracts and torts), where the aim 
is to facilitate the exercise of private choice in the most efficient way.24 But is 
predictability and certainty necessary to the same extent within a regime of public 
governance, such as competition law? For example, it is possible to argue that 
greater predictability of the competition law remedy might facilitate the breach of the 
primary right, as it would be possible for the undertaking to calculate precisely the 
costs and benefits of the violation and therefore to make sure that the breach of the 
primary right is profitable. However, contrary to what might happen in regimes of 
private governance,25 a breach of the primary right can never be efficient in 
                                                          
20
 Barker, supra note 18, at 312. 
21
 Birks, supra note 14, at 10. 
22
 Id. at 17. 
23
 Id. at 23.  
24
 On the classification of the legal system in regimes of private and public governance, see ANTHONY 
OGUS, COSTS AND CAUTIONARY TALES: ECONOMIC INSIGHTS FOR THE LAW 71-86 (2006). 
25
 For example, the breach of a contract might be efficient because the profit of the breach would 
exceed the profit from completion of the contract. See, for instance, Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. 
Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an 
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competition law, as efficiency is one of the criteria for defining the existence of a 
breach. Remedial discretion and the consequent unpredictability of the remedy are 
therefore tolerated, as long as it is within acceptable limits from the point of view of 
the rule of law. Discretion will be constrained by rules, but these rules do not provide 
a stable basis for predicting legal outcomes and the way these rules apply owe much 
to variable and discretionary factors.  
 There are inherent risks in adopting a strict separation of primary rights and 
remedies, and the strong discretionary remedialism that ensues. First, remedies 
have a purpose and this purpose is inevitably defined, at least, with regard to the 
primary right that has been violated or the wrong that has been committed. It is 
impossible to totally disconnect the two, even if they are subject to different criteria. 
Second, the requirements of the “rule of law” are not only procedural but also 
substantive. For example, the concept of proportionality, a justiciable expression of 
the rule of law, has both a procedural and a substantive nature. The latter is 
intrinsically linked to the scope of the primary right. It follows that there must be 
some degree of logical connection between primary rights or wrongs and remedies, 
without that, however, leading to question the existence of two separate legal 
categories. As Kit Barker rightly observes:  
the way in which the primary right is described tends to suggest a certain logical 
range of responses to its violation: to adumbrate a range of viable secondary 
rights . . . The criteria which set up the primary right none the less remain distinct 
from those which weigh upon a court’s decision how to respond, when it is 
violated.26 
In conclusion, the theoretical distinction between rights (or wrongs) and remedies 
should not lead one to conceptualize one category in isolation from the other. This 
chapter advocates a reflexive relationship between primary and secondary rights 
(rights and remedies)27. Such an approach will facilitate the understanding of the 
meaning and the purpose of the right that has been violated:  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Enforcement Model and A Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 Columbia L Rev 554 (1977) and the 
discussion in RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 120 (2003). 
26
 Barker, supra note 18, at 320. 
27
 Id. at 323. 
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Just as the way the primary right is defined has an effect upon the range of 
responses which can logically attend its violation, so too, the selection of a 
particular response contributes to our impression of the meaning and the 
purpose of the right violated. . . . [W]e judge the nature and power of a 
primary right by observing the way courts react to its violation in their selection 
of remedy or—which is the same thing—in their allocation of secondary 
rights.28 
Furthermore, this approach implies that the limits to discretionary remedialism 
should not only be of procedural nature but should also relate to the substance of the 
primary right. 
 
3. The Liability/Remedy distinction as an expression of the relationship 
between economic efficiency/distributive justice and corrective justice 
 
The question about discretionary remedialism can also be integrated into the 
broader framework of the relationship between economic efficiency and corrective 
justice or the relation between distributive justice and corrective justice. We will start 
with a definition of what each concept entails. The debate has been virulent in the 
area of torts. Competition law can be perceived as a special case of economic tort, 
therefore the different positions in this debate could be relevant to our analysis. 
For the tenants of economic efficiency as wealth maximization, the concepts of 
economic efficiency and corrective justice are collapsed. If the aim of the legal 
system is to promote wealth maximization, this objective will transcend the remedies 
phase as well.29 This duty to act in conformity to the principle of wealth maximization 
could potentially confer an important remedial discretion, as it would be possible to 
promote through the adoption of remedies any measure that would achieve 
                                                          
28
 Id. 
29
 Richard A. Posner, The Concept of Corrective Justice in Recent Theories of Tort Law, 10 J. Legal 
Stud. 187, 201 (1981) (noting that “in [the economic theory of law], laws is a means of bringing about 
an efficient [in the sense of wealth maximizing] allocation of resources by correcting externalities and 
other distortions in the market’s allocation of resources). The idea of rectification in the Aristotelian 
sense is implicit in this theory”. For a criticism of this view of the Aristotelian theory of corrective 
justice, see Bill Shaw& William Martin, Aristotle and Posner on Corrective Justice: The Tortoise and 
the Hare, 9 BUS. ETHICS Q. 651 (1999). 
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maximization of wealth, without any specific limit imposed by corrective justice.30 For 
example, it is possible to adopt remedies that impose a better, from a wealth 
maximization perspective, competitive equilibrium than the one existing prior to the 
occurrence of the specific illegal practice. For example, the counterfactual to 
compute damages in case of an exclusionary abuse of dominant position may be 
that of perfect competition or an oligopoly equilibrium in which the competitors of the 
liable firm obtain profits and set up the investments to properly serve the market, 
whereas the situation, prior to the violation was that of a dominant firm with a 
competitive fringe equilibrium. It is only if there is a presumption that the pre-
transactional situation is the most efficient one, from a wealth maximization 
perspective, that the principle of corrective justice could be constrained in modifying 
the pre-transactional competitive equilibrium. In an economic efficiency inspired legal 
framework, it would be theoretically possible to refuse to adopt a remedy. Thus, the 
remedy would ignore corrective justice, if the result of such implementation of 
corrective justice would be to reduce the aggregate total welfare.  
Deterrence (as a facet of wealth maximization) also should be added. Economic 
analysts of law view tort law’s function as mainly a deterrent device directed at 
potential tortfeasors with the view to ensure that the individuals responsible for the 
tort (specific deterrence), but also any other potential tortfeasor (general deterrence), 
would be given sufficient disincentive to be discouraged to engage in the activity in 
the future.31 Penalties should thus be sufficient to induce offenders to internalize the 
full social costs of their behavior (the internalization thesis), which supposes that if 
there is perfect detection and no social cost of imposing punishment, the optimal 
sanction will be equal to the net social (efficiency) loss post violation (compared to 
the situation prior the violation).32   
The penalty should be equal to the net harm to everyone but the offender.33 For 
cartels, the optimal penalty would be equal to the deadweight welfare loss plus the 
                                                          
30
 It is interesting here to compare the almost unlimited discretion for imposing remedies under this 
conception with the limited scope of the liability if ones uses the concept of causation. See Steven 
Shavell, An Analysis of Causation and the Scope of Liability in the Law of Torts, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 463 
(1980). 
31
 The issue is more complicated in competition law (as in all areas of commercial law) as one should 
also examine the question of the efficient allocation or mix of deterrence between the corporation and 
individuals acting on its behalf. 
32
 Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: an Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968). 
33
 William M. Landes, Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations  50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 652, 656 (1983). 
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wealth transfer to the cartel from purchasers. This penalty would deter only  
those instances of the offense in which the deadweight welfare loss  
exceeds any savings in production costs to the cartel. Accordingly, if the 
enforcement costs are positive and the probabilities of detection and punishment are 
less than perfect, optimal penalties should exceed the social (efficiency) cost of the 
violation so that they correspond to the efficiency loss caused. The minimum 
punishment for deterrence to work will be equal to the expected gain from the 
violation (including interest) multiplied by the inverse of the probability of the 
punishment being effectively imposed. The idea behind this is that the penalty must 
be sufficient to render the expected value of the violation equal to zero. By imposing 
this cost, the offense will be deterred. The internalization approach limits theoretically 
the discretion of the authorities to impose penalties, if it will lead to a less 
satisfactory, from an efficiency perspective, equilibrium than that existing prior to the 
violation.  
At the same time, if the aim is to ensure that the tortfeasor will be given sufficient 
disincentive to be discouraged from engaging in the activity in the future, the 
expected value of the violation should be negative (pure deterrence model). As 
Gardner rightly explains: 
[i]ts success in securing that actual tortfeasors bear the losses they have already 
wrongfully occasioned – its corrective success – is important mainly as a means 
of securing that, in future, fewer torts are committed, with the result that there will 
be fewer occasions, in future, for actual tortfeasors to bear the losses they 
wrongfully occasioned.34 
In this case, it would make sense to include all possible losses, including those of the 
competitor’s of the offender that were, for example, foreclosed from the market, for 
the long term effects persisting after the practice has been terminated, or upstream 
suppliers for lost sales, which, as Hovenkamp notes, are “potentially unlimited” 
losses.35 Of course, increased sanctions and excessive penalties also may deter 
efficient conduct and generate overinvestment in compliance, which might be 
inefficient. However, for the tenants of the pure deterrence model, that should not be 
                                                          
34
 John Gardner, What is Tort Law For? Part 1. The Place of Corrective Justice, 30 L. & Phil. 1, 30 
(2011). 
35
 Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust’s Protected Classes, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1989). 
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a major issue, because of the future consequence of deterring harmful conduct (and 
therefore its future positive wealth maximization effects).36 The boundaries between 
efficiency and distributive justice are blurred if the welfare of the victims is given 
more weight than that of the antitrust violators. 
Deterrence also might be an objective of corrective justice. One could thus 
distinguish between two forms of deterrence: deterrence as wealth maximization and 
deterrence as a moral requirement for corrective justice to work effectively (thus a 
form of efficiency independent from wealth maximization). As Gardener forcefully 
explains, there is a distinction to be made between the moral content of corrective 
justice and the legal principle of corrective justice:  
[the legal principle of corrective justice] is supposed to be efficient at securing 
that people conform to certain . . . moral norm of corrective justice . . . As well as 
correcting torts that have already been committed, this legal principle is apt 
systematically to deter the commission of torts that have not yet been 
committed.37 
Thus, deterrence has a role to play even for societies valuing only the moral principle 
of corrective justice and rejecting efficiency as a normative value (deterrence-based 
corrective justice approach). As with the pure deterrence wealth maximization model, 
there seem to be few limits to the discretion of authorities to impose far reaching 
remedies. 
The distinction between distributive justice and corrective justice can be 
explained by the different emphasis given in each theory of justice. Distributive 
justice describes a morally required distribution of shares of resources among 
members of a given group, either because of their membership to that group or in 
accordance with some measure of entitlement which applies to them in virtue of their 
membership. This is understood dynamically, that is across various situations in the 
specific jurisdiction. Corrective justice describes a moral obligation of repairing the 
harm caused to another person: it is thus more static as it concerns the specific 
                                                          
36
 Wouter P. J. Wils, Optimal Antitrust Fines: Theory and Practice, 29 WORLD COMPETITION 183 
(2006). 
37
 Gardner, supra note 34, at 26, 29. 
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transaction. Rights and duties in distributive justice are “agent-general”, while in 
corrective justice, “they are agent-specific.”38 
Corrective justice may be perceived as both an action triggered and limited in 
scope to a specific transaction. The remedy is measured in terms only of the 
transaction, without regard to the extra-transactional material holdings of the parties, 
and as a “substantive principle of liability and remedy”, which “requires those who 
impose wrongful losses on others to repair those losses.”39 What counts as a 
wrongful loss is not, however, something that is decided by corrective justice. On 
certain accounts, it is distributive justice that “sets the baseline against which 
wrongful costs are measured”, distributive justice providing information on the set of 
material holdings that serve as the status quo against which the wrongful costs are 
measured.40 It follows that corrective justice is the “remedial arm” of distributive 
justice.41 If this is true, one could wonder on the exact role of corrective justice and 
the reasons it merits to be held apart from distributive justice. 
The relationship between the two concepts has been put either in terms of 
normative priority or independence.42 The priority view conceives that distributive 
justice is normatively prior to corrective justice. The consequence is that corrective 
justice will be instrumental to distributive justice and its normative character will 
derive entirely from it. The duty to repair, therefore, would be granted exclusively on 
distributive justice claims. If distributive justice and corrective justice have completely 
coextensive domains, then one should reject corrective justice for the reason that 
distributive justice is logically prior, insofar as “there must be a distribution relative to 
which loss and compensation are measured.”43 As Benson notes, unless claims of 
corrective justice are grounded on independent, non-distributive, measures of 
                                                          
38
 See Stephen Perry, On the Relationship between Corrective and Distributive Justice, in OXFORD 
ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 237, 238 (Jeremy Horder ed., 4th series, Oxford Univ. Press 2000); Dennis 
Klimchuk, On the Autonomy of Corrective Justice, 23 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 49 (2003). 
39
 Klimchuck, supra note 38, at 52. 
40
 Id. 
41
 Id. at 53. 
42
  Steven Walt, Eliminating Corrective Justice, 92 VA. L. REV. 1311 (2006). 
43
 Larry A. Alexander, Causation and Corrective Justice: Does Tort Law Make Sense?, 6 L. & PHIL. 1, 
7 (1987). 
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entitlement, corrective justice will inevitably collapse to distributive justice.44 
However, as the same author notes, 
what is to preclude the injury party from claiming that the infringement should be 
viewed simply as a redistribution of holdings in accordance with the same or a 
competing criterion of distribution? If the injury party can coherently frame the 
dispute in this way, the correction of the infringement should also properly be 
characterized as an act of distributive justice, seeing that it can be viewed as a 
decision made between two competing distributive claims.45 
The wrongdoer thus could claim a different distributive claim, based, for example, 
on an alternative distributive measure (the so called Robin Hood defense). The only 
possibility, according to the same author, to avoid a counter-claim based on another 
distributive justice criterion is to presume that the distribution prior the commitment of 
the wrong was just and thus bar the injuring party from framing the violation “in terms 
of a competing distributive claim.”46 However, it might be profoundly unjust and 
arbitrary to confer this presumption of validity to the pre-transactional allocation 
rather than to the new arrangement.47 In conclusion, corrective justice is independent 
from distributive justice only if one assumes that the pre-transactional distribution is 
just. A similar conclusion is reached by Jules Coleman when he notes that “if 
corrective justice provides moral reasons for repairing a loss, then the underlying 
claims sustained by corrective justice must themselves express requirements of 
distributive justice […] This relationship appears to rob corrective justice of its moral 
independence.”48  
This debate is of particular interest for our discussion of discretionary 
remedialism. If corrective justice (the remedy) is derivative of distributive justice 
(liability), the assumption being that the pre-transactional allocation of entitlements is 
just, then, the remedy cannot go further than restoring the pre-transactional situation. 
It cannot modify it to an allegedly superior distributive justice measure. In other 
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words, the pre-transactional distributive justice entitlement is the only measure of the 
remedy. 
On the contrary, proponents of the independence view advocate that corrective 
justice and distributive justice are normatively independent, in particular if an 
obligation of repair could apply without regard to the satisfaction of the demands of 
distributive justice. Steven Perry explains: 
Corrective justice is a general moral principle that is concerned, not with 
maintaining a just distribution, but rather with repairing harm. Individuals can be 
harmed in a number of different ways, and corrective justice accordingly protects 
a number of different kinds of interest and entitlement, Distributive justice often 
contributes to the legitimacy of an entitlement that corrective justice protects, and 
in that sense there is a normative connection between the two. But corrective 
justice does not protect the entitlement qua distributive share, and its purpose is 
not to maintain or preserve a distributive scheme as such. Rather it protects a 
legitimate entitlement because interference with the entitlement harms the 
entitlement-holder. In that sense, corrective and distributive justice are 
conceptually independent.49 
 
This dissociation of corrective justice and distributive justice does not mean that 
corrective justice does not have distributive consequences but only that the 
preservation of distributive claims is not part of its purpose. The idea is that while 
corrective justice protects legitimate entitlements, this is not done because of a 
distributive justice consideration but because of the duty to repair harm imposed by 
corrective justice. The concept of harm thus dissociates the concept of corrective 
justice from that of distributive justice. Perry observes that: 
(t)he moral focus of the victim’s claim is the harm she has suffered. She is 
saying: you harmed me, and therefore you have a moral obligation to 
compensate me. The injurer responds with the argument that, distributively 
speaking, it would be better if he did not have to pay compensation. At most we 
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have two distinct kinds of moral claims which must be balanced against one 
another.50 
The concept of harm responds to the inadequacy, according this view, of 
applying the concept distributive justice to momentary states, for the reason that 
distributive justice theories give rise to “great deal of indeterminacy,” as they operate 
through institutions and over time, that is, according to abstract and long-term 
patterns.51 In contrast, corrective justice creates duties to repair that apply at 
particular moments and thus is normatively independent of distributive justice. 
Nevertheless, even if the concept of corrective justice is perceived as independent 
from that of distributive justice, the duty to repair is limited by the “harm” incurred by 
the injured party. It would not be thus possible to completely dissociate the remedy 
from the liability phase, as it is in the latter one that harm is defined. 
 
Efficiency as 
Wealth 
Maximization
Distributive 
Justice
Corrective 
Justice
Efficiency 
as 
deterrence
Corrective Justice
Pre-t
DJ
Post T
DJ
 
In conclusion, it is only if one adopts a pure deterrence wealth-maximization view 
or a deterrence-based corrective justice view that discretionary remedialism would 
be more pronounced. Having discussed the relation between the liability and the 
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remedy phases and the interaction between the principles of efficiency as wealth 
maximization, corrective justice and distributive justice, I will now turn to the aims 
pursued by competition law remedies. 
 
4. The Aim of Competition Law Remedies 
 
Competition law remedies are adopted with the principal aim to restore 
competition in the market.52 This includes first the “micro” goals of putting the 
infringement to an end, compensating the victims,53 and curing the particular 
problem to competition, but also the “macro” goal of putting incentives in place “so as 
to minimize the recurrence of just such anticompetitive conduct.”54 This study adopts 
a broader view of the concept of remedies than Council Regulation 1/2003 on the 
implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 101 and 102 TFEU55 
According to Article 7 of Regulation 1/2003, the aim of competition law remedies is 
“to bring the infringement effectively to an end.” Remedies should therefore be 
distinguished from sanctions against undertakings, as the latter aim to punish the 
infringer and to provide compensation to victims or society in general.56 This 
distinction does not adequately take into account that both sanctions and remedies 
affect the incentives of the wrongdoers’ in their future behavior on the market and 
thus may lead to restore competition. Remedies perform different objectives, such as 
stopping the illegal conduct and preventing its recurrence, restoring competition, 
deterrence, providing just compensation or disgorgement of illicit profits. This overall 
approach may provide a more useful analytical framework for analyzing the effect of 
competition law on the specific market. Furthermore, the restrictive position adopted 
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by Regulation 1/2003 concerns public enforcement and does not take into account 
the emerging role of private enforcement in EU competition law.  
Remedies seek generally to restore “the plaintiff’s rightful position, that is, to 
the position that the plaintiff would have occupied if the defendant had never violated 
the law” or “to restore the defendants to the defendant’s rightful position, that is, the 
position that the defendant would have occupied absent the violation.”57 In other 
words, remedies are a cure to a “wrong” the plaintiff committed, “in contravention of 
some legally-recognized right of the plaintiff’s”58 or of the category of right-recipients 
that the legislator intended to protect. The wrong of the defendant gives rise to the 
enforceable right of the plaintiff (or the protected category) to impose on the 
defendant a correlative duty to stop the illegal behavior, pay damages, make 
restitution, or adopt a specific behavior. Article 7 of Regulation 1/2003 does not 
oppose this conceptualization of remedies, as it links the adoption of a remedy to the 
end of the infringement, a concept that might be understood narrowly, the 
termination of the illegal conduct, but also, more broadly, as outcome-oriented, thus 
requiring the reversal of the effects of the illegal conduct. 
An important aspect in the definition of remedies is therefore to determine 
who would be the beneficiary of this right. In other words, the protected category 
retains the right to impose a correlative duty to the defendant. We will assume that 
the protected category for competition law remedies is the consumers of the relevant 
market harmed by the “wrong” committed by the defendant.59 A wider perspective 
would be to consider that the protected category consists of the “broader public” 
deriving benefits from the principle of competition, allegedly jeopardized by the 
practices of the dominant firm.60  
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Whichever perspective is chosen, “restoring competition” should not be 
interpreted as reaching perfect competition (or free competition if one takes a 
deontological perspective), which is practically unattainable, and in some cases a 
normatively undesirable objective from a public policy perspective.61 The remedy 
aims to restore the market that would have existed in the absence of the conduct 
found illegal, that is, what is commonly called the “but for” market conditions.  
Competition law remedies list also a prophylactic objective. Threy are to 
“ensure that there remain no practices likely to result in monopolization in the 
future.’62 This is certainly a difficult enterprise that requires from the courts a 
guessing exercise linked to a counterfactual analysis of the situation in the market 
with and without the specific competition law violations. This is particularly true in 
complex and dynamically evolving markets, where static models cannot easily 
predict the situation that would have existed absent the restraint. It also requires a 
difficult decision on the appropriate remedy enforcement mechanism, as the judge or 
the authority should decide on the degree of her involvement (as opposed to market 
forces or regulatory institutions) in the operation. One could indeed perceive the 
operation of designing appropriate remedies as being, first of all, a decision over the 
need for regulatory interference in order to bring the self-correcting forces of the 
market back to their usual operation as the default mechanism that would adjust the 
incentives of market actors and therefore the interaction between supply and 
demand in the specific sector of the economy. Thus, remedies could be (i) setting up 
conditions for the market to work or (ii) directly influencing or guiding the market. 
There are of course different choices that can be made and combined in order 
to affect the incentives of market actors and restore “competition,” defined as the 
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best possible outcome for the consumers of the specific relevant market in terms of 
price, quality, variety, innovation etc, if one assumes, as does this study, a 
consumer-driven competition law. First, it is possible to contract out the remedy to 
other affected market participants by enabling them to sue for the recuperation of the 
damages suffered because of the conduct found illegal or for more than the 
damages incurred in order to deter market participants from adopting a similar 
anticompetitive conduct in the future. Second, it is possible to develop remedies that 
would affect the discretion of market participants to run their business, in other words 
affect their autonomy as market participants and consequently their incentives. The 
latter could be conceived as a continuum ranging from preserving some degree of 
discretion for market participants (in the case of contractual remedies, such as 
commitments) to purely non-voluntary schemes, unilaterally imposed by the public 
authorities. One could also distinguish remedies that relate to the conduct of the 
market participants and attempt to affect their incentives to adopt a specific form of 
conduct (by creating disincentives such as fines, or, more brutally, by imposing 
injunctions, interdictions, conduct remedies) from more intrusive remedies that affect 
the infringing company’s assets (structural remedies) or the management’s status 
(criminal sanctions) and thus produce direct effects within the boundaries of the 
corporation (hierarchy).63 
 
5. Competition Law Remedies for Violations of Article 102 TFEU 
 
An empirical analysis of the remedies adopted by the European Commission and 
the European courts in the enforcement of Article 102 (see Annex) shows that fines 
constitute the measure that is most frequently used, with conduct remedies being 
adopted in a small number of cases and structural remedies to even fewer cases 
(Table 1). Substitutionary remedies, such as fines, are obviously easier to impose 
and to administer than the more complex, generally, conduct remedies. The novelty 
of the competition law issues that arose in the liability phase of the decisions have 
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often led the Commission to decide not to impose any fine or a remedy. This 
demonstrates the interaction between remedies and the nature of competition law 
violations.  
Table 1: Remedies in Article 102 TFEU 
 
 
 
Conduct remedies may take different forms. A constant feature is that, in most 
cases, they respond directly to the nature of the competition law violation. A refusal 
to deal/license case often involves as a remedy an obligation to supply or to license.  
Price discrimination, selective price cutting or predatory pricing claims are often dealt 
with an obligation to ensure that prices are justified by objective considerations and 
by an injunction to stop practicing discriminatory, selective or predatory prices. 
Exclusive dealing and tying claims might lead to conduct remedies that are more 
intrusive, in the sense that they affect the product or the contractual design. In some 
cases the Commission has also imposed divestiture remedies. In cases involving 
loyalty rebates the Commission and the Courts have essentially imposed fines. 
Presumably the companies would not be able to use the exact rebate scheme that 
Remedies Article 102 TFEU
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Fines
Price related
Conduct
Structural
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was found illegal. The choice of fines over other conduct remedies might be 
influenced by deterrence reasons and the difficulty to decide remedial schemes that 
might affect the commercial freedom of the undertakings in their pricing decisions, in 
particular as the criteria for defining what constitutes a loyalty rebate have been 
unclear, at least before the publication by the Commission of its guidance on its 
enforcement priorities under Article 102 TFEU.64 
However in a number of cases, the Commission has moved further than just 
adopting conduct remedies mirroring the abuse. The remedies attempt to engineer 
some form of market or product design. Prophylactic measures imposed to dominant 
undertakings include the implementation of broad competition law compliance 
programs, the duty to refrain not only from practices that were found abusive but also 
from any measure that would adversely affect the competitive position of their 
competitors, the imposition of a duty to release capacity on the market (see Annex).  
This trend is particularly clear in the second Microsoft case.65 Following 
complaints in December 2007 by Opera, the Norwegian Internet browser maker, the 
Commission alleged a violation by Microsoft of Article 102 TFEU for tying its web 
browser Internet Explorer to its dominant client PC operating system, Windows. On 
16 December 2009 the Commission accepted Microsoft’s commitments.66 Microsoft 
committed to (i) distribute a “choices screen’ through software update67 to European 
users of Windows XP, Windows Vista, Windows 7, and Windows client PC operating 
systems, and (ii) allow both OEMs and users to turn on or off Internet Explorer.68 The 
choices screen will give those users who have set Internet Explorer as their default 
web browser an opportunity to choose whether to install (and which) competing web 
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browser(s) in addition to the one(s) they already have.69 Users will be able to select 
one or more of the web browsers offered through the choices screen. Microsoft has 
committed to distribute and install the choices screen software update “in a manner 
that is designed to bring about installation of this update at a rate that is as least as 
high as that for the most recent version of Internet Explorer offered via Windows 
Update.”70 
This remedy does not correspond to the consumer harm story that the 
Commission advanced in this case. The Commission relied on the relatively 
favourable case law on tying which establishes a form of quasi per se illegality 
treatment under Article 102 TFEU if a company has a dominant position. However, 
the “must carry” commitment accepted by the Commission as an adequate remedy 
for the competition problem does not address directly this particular risk of abuse. 
Unbundling would seem to be the most appropriate remedy for a tying concern 
based on leveraging. However, the Commission reacted negatively when Microsoft 
decided to unbundle IE from Windows 7-E.71 The “must carry” remedy which was 
ultimately adopted fits better with an essential facilities case, where Windows would 
have been considered indispensable for the distribution of an Internet browser.  
 
This apparent lack of logical coherence between the remedy adopted and the 
theory of harm might be justified if one takes a position close to that of discretionary 
remedialism. But this is not without affecting the nature of the primary right and 
consequently the scope of the antitrust liability of the dominant firm that is delimited 
by the theory of harm. The risk of strategic litigation is also present if plaintiffs could 
employ theories of harm that are easy to prove (because of particular presumptions) 
in order to achieve the most far reaching remedies, in terms of commitments from a 
dominant firm. Discretionary remedialism should thus give way to some form of 
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logical (causal) connection between the remedy and liability, without, however that 
leading to collapse the two legal categories to one. The principle of remedial 
proportionality provides a useful compromise between these two positions. 
 
6. The Need for a Principle of Remedial Proportionality 
 
The principle of proportionality constitutes an important limit to the European 
Commission’s discretion in imposing remedies.72 The principle is included in Article 
49(3) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU providing that “the severity of 
penalties must not be disproportionate to the criminal offence.” It is explicitly 
provided in Article 7 of Regulation 1/2003 that the Commission may impose on 
undertakings any behavioral or structural remedies which are proportionate to the 
infringement committed and necessary to bring the infringement effectively to an 
end. This provision mainly codifies previous case law of the Court relying on Article 
3(1) of Regulation 17/62 that the remedies imposed should “not exceed what is 
appropriate’ and should be ‘necessary to attain the objective sought, namely [to 
restore] compliance with the rules infringed.”73 Structural remedies are generally not 
favoured, if there is no equally effective behavioral remedy or where any equally 
effective behavioral remedy would be more burdensome for the undertaking 
concerned, as otherwise the remedy might be disproportional. The principle of 
proportionality takes an arithmetic form in Article 23(2) of the Regulation providing 
that the Commission may impose fines on undertakings that may not exceed 10 per 
cent of its total turnover in the preceding business year (an attempt by the legislator 
to draw a rough balance between the anticompetitive harm and the harm to the 
undertaking’s financial position). In addition, in fixing the amount of the fine, regard 
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shall be had both to the gravity and to the duration of the infringement as well as to 
the effect of the competition law infringement on the market.74  
The General Court (previously Court of First Instance) has also recently 
applied the principle of proportionality to commitment decisions adopted under 
Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003: In Alrosa, the Court held that “the voluntary nature of 
the commitments . . . does not relieve the Commission of the need to comply with 
the principle of proportionality, because it is the Commission’s decision which makes 
those commitments binding” and that “giving that commitment, the undertakings 
concerned merely assented, for their own reasons, to a decision which the 
Commission was empowered to adopt unilaterally.”75 The Commission is subject to 
the same duty of applying the principle of proportionality in adopting Article 7 or 9 
decisions, which would require, in the case of Article 9 “an appraisal in concreto of 
the viability of those intermediate solutions,” that were not finally chosen by the 
Commission.76 However, in a recent judgement, the Court of Justice of the EU (Court 
of Justice) struck down the judgement of the General Court for having applied the 
same level of proportionality control to Article 9 and to Article 7 decisions.77 The 
Court of Justice noted that “the obligation on the Commission to ensure that the 
principle of proportionality is observed has a different extent and content, depending 
on whether it is considered in relation to the former or the latter article.”78 
The principle of proportionality is given a specific content in Article 7 of 
Regulation 1/2003 and in the competition law case law of the European courts.79 It 
requires that  
measures adopted by Community institutions do not exceed the limits of what 
is appropriate and necessary in order to attain the legitimate objectives 
pursued by the legislation in question; when there is a choice between several 
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appropriate measures, recourse must be had to the least onerous, and the 
disadvantages caused must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued.80  
Proportionality is also a general principle of Community law, applying as such to all 
measures adopted by Community institutions. According to settled case law,  
by virtue of that principle, the lawfulness of the prohibition of an economic 
activity is subject to the condition that the prohibitory measures are 
appropriate and necessary in order to achieve the objectives legitimately 
pursued by the legislation in question; when there is a choice between several 
appropriate measures recourse must be had to the least onerous, and the 
disadvantages caused must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued.81  
This three-part test has, of course, to take into account the margin of discretion of 
the European Commission in adopting appropriate remedies. In that sense, 
proportionality differs from a cost-benefit analysis which would focus only on the 
gravity of harm and the alternative remedies that might have been imposed. That is, 
the remedy will be disproportionate when its costs and burdens outweigh its likely 
benefit of restoring competition or when its costs would be more important than an 
alternative remedy which would have also been equally effective. Proportionality may 
take into account other issues, such as the degree of judicial deference to the 
Commission’s decision, as “the appropriateness of and the need for the contested 
decision must be assessed in relation to the aim pursued by the institution.”82 
Although the principle of remedial proportionality does not exist as such in US 
antitrust law, a constitutional proportionality requirement applies to most punitive 
damages cases as well as to other types of remedies.83 
The first step of the proportionality principle is of particular interest for our 
purposes. It may indeed be advanced that the appropriate and necessary character 
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of the remedies to be imposed would require a precise remedial measurement, not 
only with regard to the magnitude and scope (amount) of the harm to 
consumers/competition or the nature of the infringement, but also in relation to the 
type of violation that was identified. This might cover a specific competition law 
category (ie a refusal to deal, a tying case, an exclusive dealing case),84 but also the 
theory of harm advanced in the specific case (ie maintenance of monopoly, 
leveraging, essential facilities). The importance of remedial fit is often stressed by 
antitrust law literature.85 It is also indirectly linked with the existence of a causal 
relation between the undertaking’s conduct and the theory of harm advanced, which 
has, as the DC Circuit held in the US Microsoft case “more purchase in connection 
with the appropriate remedy issue.”86  
 
Remedies should of course be effective. Their aim would be “to re-establish 
the competitive situation, i.e., the competitive process that would have prevailed but 
for the infringement.”87 However, it is also clear that the principle of proportionality 
requires a close fit between the harm and the remedy. Suggestions that remedies 
may go beyond “mirroring the abuse” profoundly misunderstand the relation between 
the remedy and the right it is attempting to protect.88  
A strong approach of discretionary remedialism conceives the primary right as 
being distinct from the provision of the remedies for violation of that right. There is a 
dichotomy between rights and remedies, each concept being conceptually isolated 
from the other. This formalistic position might lead to impose no remedies for the 
infringement of a right or to impose stricter remedies than the nature and effect of the 
violation of the right would have required. For example, a remedy that would go 
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beyond simply “mirroring the abuse” and would “give the infringer's competitors an 
advantage over the infringer in order to restore the competitive process”89 fixes a 
high remedial target that might go beyond the violation of the right, the alleged 
abuse. It could eventually jeopardize the dominant position of the firm, as this is an 
anomaly to the competitive process, the dominant firm having the ability to behave 
independently from its competitors. However, Article 102 TFEU does not condemn a 
dominant position as such, nor does it restrict a dominant firm’s ability to compete on 
the merits. That is, a situation that has not been qualified as an abuse.90 Remedies 
that go beyond mirroring the specific abuse could certainly be adopted in theory but 
that should be done either by advancing an additional theory of harm/liability under 
Article 102 that is more directly linked to the remedy sought or by employing a 
competition law instrument other than Article 102.91 
 
An alternative view would be to consider that rights and remedies are 
profoundly interlinked with each other, so that the remedy is the measure of the right. 
This profoundly legal realist view would consider that “the nature of the remedy 
sought in an antitrust case is often an important clue to the soundness of the 
antitrust claim”92 (the “if you cannot fix it, it isn’t broken” argument). Between these 
two poles, there is the principle of remedial proportionality. Without adopting a strict 
dichotomy between the identification of the right (or the liability step) and the remedy, 
the principle of proportionality requires a close link between the two. In an 
economically informed Article 102 this would require a fit between the theory of harm 
or the type of abuse and the remedy imposed.  
This is certainly the position adopted by the General Court in its Alrosa 
decision. The Court held that 
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compliance with the principle of proportionality requires that, when measures 
that are less onerous than those it proposes to make binding exist, and are 
known by it, the Commission should examine whether those measures are 
capable of addressing the concerns which justify its action before it adopts, in 
the event of their proving unsuitable, the more onerous approach.93  
The Commission cannot prohibit “absolutely any future trading relations between two 
undertakings unless such a decision is necessary to re-establish the situation which 
existed prior to the infringement.”94 It is only in “exceptional circumstances” such as 
“where the undertakings concerned have a collective dominant position,” that the 
Commission may prohibit undertakings completely and indefinitely from contracting 
amongst each other.95 The Court thus found that, in the absence of these 
exceptional circumstances, the Commission’s decision to require from undertakings 
to refrain for an indefinite period all direct or indirect trading relations between them 
infringes the principle of proportionality. In this case, the Commission imposed a 
complete and indefinite cessation of trading relations between Alrosa, a Russian 
diamond supplier and De Beers, a dominant undertaking on the markets 
downstream from the market for the supply of rough diamonds. The Commission 
feared that the exclusive supply commitment laid down in the agreement signed 
between Alrosa and De Beers would result in strengthening De Beers’ market power 
by excluding Alrosa from the market for the supply of rough diamonds and, 
consequently, depriving other purchasers of access to the significant source of 
supply which it represented. The Commission found that imposing this termination to 
the contractual relation between the two parties was clearly necessary in order to 
allow third parties to have access to Alrosa’s output and to allow Alrosa to compete 
fully with De Beers. The main concern was that De Beers benefited from an 
advantage over its competitors, not only because of its size but also because it was 
able to guarantee the best consistency in the supply of rough diamonds to its 
customers. This was based on De Beers having access to the output of a larger 
number of different mines producing a larger variety of rough diamonds being the 
only producer keeping large stocks.96 It was not, however, clear how the imposed 
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remedy responded to the competition concern raised. First, the Commission had not 
explained how continuing supply to De Beers would affect Alrosa’s ability to 
guarantee a regular supply of significant quantities of rough diamonds. Second, even 
if this had been the case, and the continuation of the supply would have increased 
the competitive advantage of De Beers, thus contributing to maintain or reinforce its 
dominant position on the market, this does not constitute an abuse of a dominant 
position. As it is put clearly by the Court: 
[s]ince the object of Article [102 TFEU] is not to prohibit the holding of dominant 
positions but solely to put an end to their abuse, the Commission cannot require 
an undertaking in a dominant position to refrain from making purchases which 
allow it to maintain or to strengthen its position on the market, if that undertaking 
does not, in so doing, resort to methods which are incompatible with the 
competition rules. While special responsibilities are incumbent on an undertaking 
which occupies such a position.97 
 
As noted earlier, the judgement of the General Court was set aside by theCourt of 
Justice, mainly for applying the same standard of proportionality to Article 7 and 9 
decisions. Interpreted as such, the judgement of the Court of Justice may be limited 
to Article 9 decisions, thus not denying to the General Court the possibility to subject 
Article 7 decisions to a strict proportionality test. However, there is also some 
language in the Court of Justice’s judgement that might constrain the ability of the 
General Court to perform a thorough analysis of the substantive proportionality of the 
remedy and its fit to the liability theory advanced: the General Court should in no 
case put forward its own assessment of complex economic circumstances and 
should not substitute its own assessment for that of the Commission.98 The 
Commission may therefore enjoy a wide remedial discretion by being able to find 
cover behind the nebulous and still indetermined concept of complex economic 
assessment, and thus avoid a strict proportionality control of its remedial action. 
Although one could accept that commitment decisions are subject to less intensive 
review standards, simply because of their voluntary, almost contractual, nature, such 
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an approach will not be optimal with regard to final decisions reached by the 
competition authorities. It remains to be seen if the Court of Justice’s approach will 
extend to Article 7 decisions. 
The greater incursion of courts to the remedial discretion of competition 
authorities cannot only be observed in the enforcement of EU competition law but 
affects also the application of national competition law. In some recent decisions, the 
UK Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT) has performed an assessment of the 
proportionality of the remedies imposed by the Competition Commission in a number 
of market investigation reference decisions, under Part IV of the Enterprise Act of 
2002. In Tesco Plc v. Competition Commission,99 the CAT required the Competition 
Commission to perform a ‘double proportionality’ test:  
the more important a particular factor seems likely to be in the overall 
proportionality assessment, or the more intrusive, uncertain in its effect, or 
wide-reaching a proposed remedy is likely to prove, the more detailed or 
deeper the investigation of the factor in question may need to be.100 
The application of this test presupposes that courts might eventually need to go 
beyond rationality to enquire further into the weight attached to the relevant 
considerations. The CAT is explicitly linking the remedy with the consideration of the 
“adverse effect on competition” (AEC) through the means of a proportionality test. 
The principles of this test are set as following: 
the measure: (1) must be effective to achieve the legitimate aim in question 
(appropriate), (2) must be no more onerous than is required to achieve that 
aim (necessary), (3) must be the least onerous, if there is a choice of equally 
effective measures, and (4) in any event must not produce adverse effects 
which are disproportionate to the aim pursued.101 
The methodology employed for this analysis is not, however, clearly explained by 
the CAT, which acknowledges that “the application of these principles is not an exact 
science.”102 What we have is a general reference to a “balancing exercise between 
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the (achievable) aims of the proposed measure on the one side, and any adverse 
effects it may produce on the other side.”103 The aim is of course to preserve the 
margin of appreciation of the competition authority as to the methodology employed 
‘in order to investigate and estimate the various factors which fall to be considered in 
a proportionality analysis’, the Competition Commission, in this case, having the 
discretion to “tailor its investigation of any specific factor to the circumstances of the 
case and follow such procedures as it considers appropriate.”104 
In subsequent cases, the CAT performed an intensive analysis of the 
assessment performed by national competition authorities of the proportionality of 
the remedy. In Barclays Bank Plc v. Competition Commission the CAT observed that 
“double proportionality” is not a new legal principle but  
 
simply a convenient label for the common sense proposition that, within a 
wide margin of appreciation, the depth and sophistication of analysis called for 
in relation to any particular relevant aspect of the inquiry needs to be tailored 
to the importance or gravity of the issue within the general context of the 
Commission’s task.105  
The CAT noted, with regard to the extent of the judicial review exercised by the 
Tribunal that  
[s]o far as concerns evidence, the important distinction is between a decision 
based upon no evidence, with which the Tribunal may interfere, and one 
based upon the weight given to particular evidence, which is a matter for the 
Commission, and with which the Tribunal should not interfere, in the absence 
of irrationality.106  
The Tribunal considered also that “fashioning of an effective, reasonable and 
practicable remedy requires not merely fact-finding about the market as it is, but 
analysis as to the probable effect of alternative remedies upon that market in the 
future,” which “calls for (inter alia) quantification, evaluation and the analysis of 
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causation, sensitivity and risk.”107 According to the Tribunal, “[t]he relevant failing 
must satisfy a materiality test”, which “will require the finding or decision to be 
quashed  unless the Tribunal is satisfied that a reasonable decision-maker in the 
position of the Commission would still have reached the same finding or decision.”108 
The Tribunal stroke down part of the Competition Commission’s analysis of 
adequate remedies for lack of proportionality, finding that the economic methodology 
employed by the Commission was defective and that in conjunction with the other 
failings of the decision should lead to its quashing. 
In its most recent decision, BAA Limited v. Competition Commission, the CAT 
seems to have backed up from the requirement that the proportionality test should 
require a precise quantitative analysis of the impact of the remedy, as the first step of 
a cost benefit analysis that will compare the adverse effects on competition with the 
costs of implementing the remedy and its impact on the undertakings.109 Even in the 
absence of a quantitative assessment, the requirement of a qualitative analysis of 
the impact of the remedy, in comparison to the AEC, is, however, sufficient to 
establish the link between the remedy and the wrong, and thus to question the 
foundations of discretionary remedialism. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
The topic of competition law remedies for abuse of dominant position or 
monopolization has not attracted sufficient attention from competition law scholarship 
in both sides of the Atlantic.110 There is an important difficulty in devising a coherent 
theory of competition law remedies that would accommodate the discretion that the 
European Commission or the national competition authorities traditionally enjoy in 
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this field, while preserving some logical connection between the measure adopted 
and the competition law issue identified in the liability phase of the decision. The 
problem is more acute in the new era of the effects-based approach in the 
enforcement of Article 102 TFEU. An important ingredient of this approach is the 
identification of a coherent theory of harm that will be subject to the assessment of 
the decision maker through different analytical steps.111 The implications of this 
move towards an effects-based approach for the selection of remedies and the 
operation of the proportionality principle have not, however, been adequately 
examined yet.  
An effects-based approach certainly provides fuel to the Commission’s discretion, 
even if a considerable effort is made to create some formalistic safe harbours, such 
as the price/cost test for loyalty and bundled discounts and predatory pricing abuses 
that attempt to structure, if not to restrict, the Commission’s discretion by bringing 
within the scope of the prohibition in Article 102 TFEU only practices that exclude 
“efficient competitors.”112 This study advances the argument, however, that even if 
the Commission should be recognized as having an important discretion in adopting 
the most effective remedies, it would be particularly damaging for competition law to 
lean towards discretionary remedialism. The effect will be even more devastating for 
the coherence and legitimacy of competition law, in view of the increasing role of 
private enforcement, in particular if plaintiffs could employ the less demanding, in 
terms of standard of proof, theory of consumer harm in order to achieve the most far 
reaching remedies, in terms of commitments from a dominant firm. As is shown by 
the operation of the proportionality test, logical coherence between the remedy and 
the wrong is required in EU competition law.  
The question that this study has explored is the transformation of the 
proportionality test in an effects-based approach. Should the proportionality test be 
limited to the examination of the reasonableness of the measure, or the existence of 
less restrictive (to the undertaking’s freedom of action) ways of achieving the same 
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purposes? Should the proportionality test include a cost-benefit analysis of the 
remedy with regard to its purpose, thus integrating to the assessment of the remedy 
the consideration of the adverse effect on competition? How this ends-benefits 
proportionality test could operate in the absence of a quantifiable adverse 
anticompetitive effect? This is particularly problematic in the context of Article 102 
TFEU, where the simple likelihood of an anticompetitive effect provides sufficient 
evidence of an abuse of a dominant position. Would the proportionality test in this 
case require an analysis of the theory of harm that has been advanced and a 
correspondence between the theory of harm and the type of remedy imposed? All 
these are important questions that need further elucidation. The topic of competition 
law remedies is the next challenge of antitrust law scholarship. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
